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Abstract 
This paper explores the effect of national partisanship and Euroscepticism on 
individualsÕ causal responsibility attribution in European multilevel democracies. It is 
particularly focused on the average differences in responsibility attribution in federal 
and non-federal states, as well as in countries belonging to different European Union 
enlargement waves. Using a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2009, and 2014 European 
Election Studies, results show that when poor economic outcomes are at stake, partisans 
of the national incumbent in federal states are more likely to assign responsibility to 
regional governments following a blame-attribution logic, while this logic is absent in 
non-federal states. Likewise, Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign 
responsibility to European authorities when they hold negative views of the economy 
and they belong to countries that have been European Union members for a longer 
period. 
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One of the most celebrated virtues of multilevel systems is better democratic 
governance. Indeed, classical normative theories state that multilevel governance helps 
to allocate power more efficiently to the most relevant level and enhance the control of 
governments by bringing them closer to citizens and overcoming informational 
asymmetries between representatives and represented. However, a more critical view 
stresses that vertical fragmentation of power makes the latter unable to establish a 
causal link between incumbentsÕ performance and outcomes, hampering their capacity 
to assign responsibilities. From this perspective, the peril of multilevel governance lies 
in that it makes voters less capable of attributing responsibility, weakening the reward-
punishment model and, in turn, electoral accountability. 
Certainly, individualsÕ capacity to assign responsibility between levels of 
government lies at the heart of the accountability mechanism of the reward-punishment 
model (Cutler 2004, 2008; Dubler et al. 2017). In this paper, the goal is to advance 
research on responsibility attribution by exploring responsibility judgements in 
multilevel systems. Building upon the political science literature on retrospective 
accountability and the social psychology literature on cognitive bias, the paper explores 
the role of party identification and attitudes towards the European Union in individualsÕ 
responsibility assignments, and tests for variation in this effect between different 
institutional contexts. In essence, the specific research questions are namely two: do 
group-serving biases in responsibility operate more intensely in multilevel systems than 
in countries with a unitary form of government? Do they operate more prominently in 
contexts where levels of governments are more consolidated? 
This paper provides new theoretical and empirical insights into the role of 
cognitive biases in responsibility attribution, with a particular focus in the variation 
between different institutional contexts. The first hypothesis assumes that multilevel 
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governance activates the use of cognitive bias in responsibility attribution, and thus, it 
expects in-group bias Ð namely partisanship Ð to be more intensely used in countries 
were domestic powers are more vertically fragmented, that is, federations. The second 
hypothesis states that individualsÕ attitudes towards Europe operate more prominently 
as a group serving bias in countries with an older EU membership, that is, in countries 
where EU institutions are more consolidated, and thus, become more visible targets for 
strategic attribution. These arguments are tested using a virtually unexplored set of 
questions in the European Election StudiesÕ (EES) Voter Studies. The EES platform has 
regularly asked Europeans about the level of government (regional, national, or 
European) that is responsible for the Ômost important problemÕ (MIP) in their countries. 
The theoretical grounds of the paper contribute to bridge two strands of the 
literature on responsibility attribution that so far have rarely spoken to each other, 
namely the aggregate-level institutional literature on clarity of responsibility and the 
individual-based social-psychology approach on cognitive bias (Hobolt and Tilley 
2014: 13). It does so by advancing some theoretical arguments into the relationship 
between institutional conditions and the use of partisanship and attitudes towards the 
European Union in moderating individualsÕ responsibility judgements. Second, it 
provides new empirical insights into the responsibility attribution research by exploring 
the possible existence of selective attribution of responsibility in a representative sample 
of individuals across European Union member countries. 
The article is organized as follows. In the next section the main theoretical 
implications of a model of endogenous responsibility attribution are presented, 
developing the arguments alongside the main findings in the literature. After that, there 
is a discussion of the data and methods, underscoring the existing data opportunity and 
the limits in the operationalization of responsibility attribution. Then, empirical results 
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are presented, concluding with a summary of the findings and some remarks on future 
research paths. 
Endogenous responsibility attribution in multilevel contexts 
The classical normative literature on fiscal federalism assumes that when countries are 
decentralized, voters will be more capable to hold governments accountable, and, as a 
consequence, governmentsÕ capacity to act in a fiscally irresponsible way will be 
constrained. By placing subnational governments in competition with one another, 
fiscal federalism provides subnational governments with incentives to enhance control 
of the public economy (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Qian and Weingast 1997). Yet, 
fiscal federalism models are of an ideal type (Oates et al. 1972): they envision highly 
autonomous subnational governments and a clear separation of powers between layers 
of government. These characteristics, however, are a far cry from the actual distribution 
of authority in decentralized systems. 
Federalism often means shared authority across levels of government (Rodden 
2006) and constitutions can be seen as Ôincomplete contractsÕ where the precise 
delineation of powers is not clearly defined (Riker 1964). By blurring lines of 
responsibility and increasing information costs, responsibility attribution may become a 
daunting task in multilevel states and politicians may take advantage of these structures, 
blaming other levels of government when poor performance is at stake or taking credit 
when things go well (McGraw 1990; McGraw et al. 1993; Weaver 1986). Hence, 
assuming that clarity of responsibility is the key mechanism that makes electoral 
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accountability work (Ferejohn 1986), federal arrangements may actually weaken the 
role of elections as an effective mechanism to control governments.
1
 
 
The concept of clarity of responsibility refers to the institutional characteristics 
that affect the ability of citizens to make governments accountable for policy outcomes. 
This concept has its origins in the path-breaking work of Powell and Whitten (1993), 
who showed that the degree of cohesiveness and visibility of governing institutions 
measured as a Ôclarity of responsibility indexÕ (number of parties in government, party 
cohesion, presence of bicameral opposition minority governments, strong committee 
system or federalism) significantly modifies the impact of the economy on electoral 
support for incumbent parties.
 2
 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of federalism in the aforementioned index, its 
focus is secondary in this literature, and thus, the specific consideration of the effects of 
vertical division of powers on responsibility attribution and accountability have been 
barely explored from a comparative perspective. An exception to this is the work of 
Anderson (2006), who showed that economic voting in federal states is weaker than in 
unitary ones. The causal mechanism of that empirical relationship is federalism 
undermining individualsÕ ability to administer political sanctions on the basis of 
economic or policy evaluations (2006: 451). Yet Anderson does not empirically test for 
the mechanism, so it still remains unclear how citizens try to overcome the 
informational costs that federal institutions impose. Arceneaux states that informational 
                                                
1
 Accountability is an electoral mechanism that citizens use to hold politicians responsible for 
the outcomes derived from their past actions (Przeworski et al. 1999). This requires that there is 
clarity of responsibility (Ferejohn 1986; Royed et al. 2000). 
2
 See Leyden and Borrelli (1995), Royed et al. (2000), Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998), Anderson 
(2000), Duch and Stevenson (2008), Fisher and Hobolt (2010). Whitten and Palmer (1999), De 
Vries, Edwards and Tillman (2011). Hobolt, Tilley and BanducciÕs (2013) recent contribution 
differentiates between the institutional and government clarity of responsibility, and argue that 
the latter has a stronger impact on votersÕ ability to hold governments accountable. 
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costs make voters assign responsibility randomly Ôin an erratic fashion, muting electoral 
accountabilityÕ (2006: 732), although his argument may only be capturing part of 
votersÕ reaction to complex institutional settings. 
This paper develops a complementary argument that focuses on the 
institutional/informational and social psychological components of citizensÕ 
responsibility assignments. To that end, following conventional wisdom on the effect of 
in-group attachments on individualsÕ attitudes, it is argued that, in their search for 
decision-making efficiency, citizens will tend to overcome limited information about 
who does what by turning to simple cues (Angus et al. 1960; Bartels 2000, Huckfeldt et 
al. 1999), such as party identification or national identity. As it follows, when 
confronted with the task of assigning responsibility, individuals in multilevel 
democracies may resort more frequently to in-group rationalizations. However, as 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014) emphasize, while partisanship and other in-group attachments 
may serve as a useful heuristic for, say, vote choice in elections and referendums, they 
can also lead to attribution error in multilevel systems, especially when individuals lack 
political information. 
Indeed, social psychologists have long argued that the way individuals assign 
responsibility is marked by a number of errors and biases (Fiske and Taylor 2007). 
Works in the area have shown that individualsÕ responsibility assignments also operate 
in a selective manner defined as Ôgroup-servingÕ bias: individuals tend to claim credit 
for the group with which they feel more closely identified, whereas they blame other 
groups (out-groups) for failures (Taylor and Doria 1981; Taylor and Jaggi 1974). 
Relevant group identities can be based on strong group traits, such as race or ethnicity 
(see Taylor and Jaggi 1974), or looser ones, such as being a member of a sport-team 
(Taylor and Doria 1981). Although partisanship may not qualify as a strong-group 
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identity, political science research has shown that, for instance, ideological closeness to 
the incumbent party may neutralize the impact of government performance on vote, a 
cognitive process defined as Ôselective sanctioningÕ (Tilley and Hobolt 2011: 317). 
Party rationalizations have a strong effect on responsibility judgments, as well. This 
mechanism has been defined as Ôselective attributionÕ: partisans tend to attribute 
successes to their preferred party whereas tend to exonerate them for poor performance 
(Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2008; Malhotra and Kuo 2008; Marsh and Tilley 2010; 
Rudolph 2003a, 2003b). In a similar logic, Hobolt and Tilley (2014) also show that 
peopleÕs feelings about the European Union may act as a cognitive bias in responsibility 
attribution in a comparable manner as partisanship does. They find evidence that 
individuals who feel more closely attached to the EU tend to credit it more when things 
go well, whereas those who dislike the EU tend to blame it more when things go badly 
(ibid. p.54).
3
 Similarly to the aforementioned literature on in-group biases, the literature 
has not explored whether individualÕs feelings about the European Union operate more 
strongly in some EU countries than others when moderating attribution of 
responsibility. 
Therefore, the focus of the paper is on the role of both 1) partisanship and 2) 
individualsÕ attachment to the EU as perceptual screens that filter individualsÕ 
responsibility assignments in multilevel systems. The hypotheses complement previous 
literature by connecting in-group bias to institutional characteristics. On the one hand, 
building upon recent theoretical contributions in the area (Len and Orriols 2016), this 
paper argues that federal institutions will activate the use of cognitive bias in 
responsibility attribution, accordingly expecting partisanship to be more intensely used 
                                                
3
 Hobolt and Tilley (2014) also use EES data in their analysis; specifically, the 2009 Voter 
Study questions on the attribution of responsibility to national governments and to the European 
Union for five different policy domains. 
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in countries were powers are nationally vertically fragmented. Two are the mechanisms 
whereby federalism may activate the role of cognitive bias in responsibility assignment: 
informational challenges and opportunity structures (Len and Orriols 2016). The first 
mechanism (information) is about how individuals use mental shortcuts (heuristics), 
such as partisanship or identity, to assign responsibility; the more difficult it is for 
voters to ascertain who is responsible for what, the more likely it is they will use party 
affiliation or identity to attribute credit and blame for policy outcomes. This argument 
speaks to the very few studies that explore the role of contextual conditions in the use of 
cognitive heuristics, which show that in Ôlow informationÕ contexts shortcuts are more 
intensely employed by voters (Brown 2010; Cutler 2004, 2008; Lau and Redlawsk 
2001; McDermott 1997).
4
 The second mechanism has to do with how federalism creates 
an opportunity for individuals to engage in an attribution game, fundamentally by 
increasing the number of relevant political actors (regional governments) to whom 
blame and credit might be attributed. Put it differently, the vertical fragmentation of 
powers paves the way for Ôin-groupÕ bias, since Ôfavouring onesÕ group may become 
easier when there are more potential Òout-groupsÓ to which failure can be attributedÕ 
(Len and Orriols 2016)
5
.  
On the other hand, following upon the opportunity structure argument (see also 
Lees 2008; Wilson and Hobolt 2015), this paper states that individualsÕ feelings about 
the European Union will have a stronger moderating role on responsibility assignments 
in countries where European institutions are more consolidated. The underlying 
argument is that a political group becomes more ÔblameableÕ or ÔcreditableÕ the more 
                                                
4
 A similar argument is used by Rohrschneider, Rdiger Schmitt-Beck, and Franziska to explain 
why economic voting in the German general election of 2009 was weaker than in other 
European countries (quoted in Bermeo and Bartels (2014: 205)). 
5
 For an assessment of blame-shifting between politicians, see Hartung and Tosung (2017) 
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salient it is for individuals. The assumption is that European institutions will be more 
consolidated and visible for individuals in those countries that have been members of 
the EU for a longer period. Consolidated institutions are more likely to become a target 
for individualsÕ strategic responsibility attribution than institutions that are less 
entrenched. Accordingly, the expectation is that individualsÕ feelings about the EU will 
affect responsibility attribution more intensely in countries with older EU membership. 
In summary, partisanship should have a stronger moderating role in the 
assignment of responsibility in federal countries than in non-federal countries (H1). 
Likewise, individual attitudes towards the EU should have a stronger moderating role in 
the assignment of responsibility in countries that have belonged to the EU for a longer 
period (H2). 
Data and methods 
The European Elections Studies (EES) platform has ever since 1999 European 
Parliament election asked respondents in its Voter Study to identify the perceived main 
responsible level of government for the Ômost important problemÕ (MIP) in their 
countries at the time of the question
6 
. To our best knowledge, this question represents 
the only available measure of multilevel attribution of responsibility in various countries 
over several years.
7
 Respondents Ð in a representative sample of European member 
states Ð are first requested to state which is the most important problem that their 
                                                
6
 MIP responses have regularly been used in literature to characterize individual, as well as 
aggregate-level public attention to issues, concerns, or problem status at particular points in 
time and over time (Heffington et al. 2017; Jennings and Wlezien 2011; Jones 1994; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2004; MacKuen and Coombs 1981; McCombs and Shaw 1972). MIPs have also 
been used as proxies for policy preferences (for example, Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; John 
2006) although some scholars state that MIPs and spending preferences tap very different things 
(Jennings and Wlezien 2015). 
7
 Despite the evident data opportunity that these questions present, only few studies have 
specifically cited their use, mainly for descriptive purposes focused on normative approaches to 
the role of the European Union (De Winter and Swyngedouw 1999). 
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countries face.
8
 Then, they are subsequently asked to attribute its responsibility to either 
the regional, the national, or the European level of government,
9
 regardless of the level 
of territorial distribution of power in their countries.
10
 
There is, however, a caveat related to the limits of measuring responsibility 
attribution through the Ômost important problemÕ question, as it is a question that can be 
capturing different types of responsibility attribution. As Rudolph (2006) and Hobolt 
and Tilley (2014: 10) note, responsibility attribution has different components. One is 
functional, which measures the formal (constitutional) allocation of responsibility 
between levels of government for matters in a policy area. Individuals expect 
governments to serve in those areas they are responsible for. For example, in most of 
federal states subnational governments have responsibility for education or healthcare, 
whereas the federal government has responsibility for defence or monetary policy. The 
second component of responsibility attribution is causal responsibility, which involves 
the retrospective assignment of blame or credit for the conditions in a particular policy 
area. Governments are assigned responsibility for having caused a policy outcome 
through their actions or inactions. As Hobolt and Tilley (2014) recognize, causal and 
functional responsibility are closely related. Rudolph (2006) adds a third component, 
that is, the desired responsibility to do something in a given policy domain Ð meaning 
that citizens wish a particular level of government to act in that specific area Ð. These 
three types of responsibility Ð causal, functional, and desired Ð may be conflated in our 
operationalization of responsibility attribution through the mentioned question in the 
                                                
8
 Questions are open-ended with the verbatim later recoded by issue in the 2009 and 2014 
waves. In 2004, the question had a list of problems that respondents could choose from. 
9
 Specific question wording through waves: ÔAs of today, is (the most important problem) 
mainly dealt with by regional, national, or European political authorities?Õ (2004 and 2009) 
and ÔAs of today, at which level do you think (the most important problem) is dealt with?Õ 
(2014). 
10
 Descriptive statistics on the distribution of our dependent variable by institutional context are 
provided in the online appendix.
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EES. As the goal of the paper is to analyse the role of in-group attachments when 
attributing responsibility for policy outcomes (causal responsibility), the attempt is to 
control for other types of responsibility (functional and desired) via some of our 
explanatory variables, as it is developed below. 
We have pooled EES data for 2004, 2009 and 2014
11
 into a single database
12
 and 
organized the empirical analysis in two sections, each one testing one of the 
hypotheses.
13
 The dependent variable is the attribution of responsibility for the Ômost 
important problemÕ to three mutually exclusive levels of authority: the European Union, 
national or regional authorities. The analysis explores how partisanship and European 
identity shape the attribution of responsibility to these three levels in different contexts. 
Partisanship is operationalized through party identification, a dummy variable that is 
coded as 1 when respondents feel close to the national incumbent party (operationalized 
as the prime ministerÕs party) and 0 otherwise.
14
 PeopleÕs feelings about the European 
Union are operationalized with a dummy variable labelled Eurosceptic that takes the 
value of 1 for those who consider their countriesÕ membership of the European Union to 
be a Ôbad thingÕ or are indifferent about it and 0 for those that consider it positive. 
In order to measure causal responsibility (responsibility for policy outcomes), 
we need to link responsibility to the conditions of a particular policy area. Note that Ôthe 
                                                
11 We do not include 1999 because of the lack of retrospective economic evaluations. 
12 Countries and years included are the following: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and 
United Kingdom are in the three waves (2004, 2009, and 2014). We also have data for 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Malta in the 2009 and 2014 waves, and for Croatia in the 2014 wave. 
13 For the sake of the robustness of our results, we estimated our empirical models twice: first, 
we limited our dependent variable to those respondents mentioning economic MIPs, and later 
on we re-estimated them including any mentioned problem. Since the magnitude and 
significance of our results hold to a large extent, we have decided to report only the latter, 
though the former are accessible in our online appendix. 
14 ÔDo you consider yourself to be close to any particular political party?Õ 1 is coded as support 
to the Prime MinisterÕs party. 0 refers to any other mentioned political party or lack of 
identification with any party. 
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most important problemÕ is a too broad statement to allow for any inference about: a) 
the specific policy individuals are assigning responsibility for; and b) their evaluation of 
outcomes in that policy domain. Given that 60% of the Ômost important problemsÕ 
identified by respondents in the sample are directly or indirectly related to the 
economy
15
, policy outcomes are operationalized using retrospective evaluations of the 
economy (1 for those who think that the economy has become Ômuch worseÕ or Ôlittle 
worseÕ and 0 for the rest (stayed the same, little better and much better)). The idea is to 
capture whether the impact of partisanship and support to the EU changes responsibility 
attribution according to the positive or negative evaluations of the economy. Positive 
evaluations of economic outcomes may result in an over-attribution of responsibility to 
the in-group (national government for partisans and Eurosceptic citizens) whereas 
negative evaluations may result in exonerative strategies (blaming out-groups). 
Therefore, the interest is in the interaction between retrospective evaluations of the 
economy and the in-groups of interest in this paper (national incumbent partisans and 
Eurosceptics).  
We employ multinomial logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by 
member country. In all models the reference category is the national level. Multinomial 
logistic coefficients for choosing different levels should thus be interpreted relative to 
the probability of assigning responsibility to the national authorities. 
A set of controls are also included in an attempt to isolate causal responsibility 
from functional responsibility and desired responsibility. First, we account for 
respondentsÕ general levels of information about politics (informed). Previous evidence 
                                                
15  Economic issues can be defined narrowly to include macroeconomic concerns, e.g. 
ÔinflationÕ, ÔunemploymentÕ, ÔdebtÕ, Ôthe economy conditionsÕ, and the like. Those represent the 
43.26% of the MIPs mentioned by respondents for the whole period in our sample. If we 
include distributional economic problems (wages and taxes) within the category, this percentage 
goes up to 59.86 (Marsh and Tilley 2010; Wlezien 2005,). 
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shows that more knowledgeable voters discern better the existing constitutional 
distribution of powers between levels of government (Anderson 2008; Len 2012; 
Tilley and Hobolt 2011). This variable is operationalized taking into account how 
closely the respondent followed the elections by combining the answers on how often 
he/she followed the elections through the television, newspapers, internet, attended 
public meetings, and discussed the election with family and friends.
16
 Respondents level 
of education is also controlled.
17
 This should capture variation across individuals in 
their capacity to assign  functional responsibility, as more informed and educated voters 
should be able to discern better the responsible level of government in different policy 
areas. Second, desired responsibility assignments are taken into account by introducing 
a variable which measures the level of government that individuals think that should 
deal with the mentioned Ômost important problemÕ.
18
 The reference category is the 
national level. 
To test whether the role of in-group bias is more intense in multilevel states (H1) 
there is a dummy variable -federal- that is coded as 1 in federal countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, and Spain) and 0 in non-federal states. To test whether peopleÕs 
feelings about the EU has a stronger moderating role in older EU member states there is 
a dummy variable, old EU membership, that is coded as 1 for countries that accessed the 
EU before 2004 and 0 for countries that accessed the EU afterwards. 
Finally, sociodemographic controls are introduced, namely age and gender. 
These variables have no substantive theoretical implications for the purpose of this 
                                                
16 By adding all these variables, we have an index that ranges from 0 to 15. 
17 Education is an ordinal variable that takes the value of 0 for respondents with 0 to 15 years 
of education, 1 for respondents with 16 to 19 years, and 2 for those with 20 or more years. 
18  ÔAnd who do you think would be most appropriate to deal with (the most important 
problem): regional, national, or European political authorities?Õ (2004 and 2009) and ÔAnd at 
which level do you think (the most important problem) should be dealt with?Õ (2014). 
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paper, and thus, they are not included in the reported tables. All models are estimated 
using year fixed-effects. 
Results 
Table 1 displays a first set of results without any institutional variables. In Model 1.1, 
there is a test of the general impact of causal responsibility, that is, the effect of negative 
retrospective evaluations of the economy upon responsibility attribution. Results show 
that there is no significant effect of retrospective economic evaluations upon 
individualsÕ responsibility judgements. Worse retrospective evaluations do not lead to 
blame a particular level of government. There is, however, an important effect of the 
desired responsibility attribution on responsibility assignments. The sign of the 
coefficients in the Ôwho shouldÕ variable indicates that individuals tend to assign 
responsibility to the level of government they would prefer to be dealing with the Ômost 
important problemÕ. This is a strong effect, of a relevant magnitude and consistent 
across models. 
Models 1.2 and 1.3 test whether causal responsibility is mediated through Ôin-
groupÕ biases by interacting retrospective evaluations with National Incumbent 
Partisans (Model 1.2) and Eurosceptics (Model 1.3). Results for partisanship (Model 
1.2) show that the worse the economic evaluation the more likely it is that national 
incumbent partisans assign responsibility to the European and regional levels. This 
result already indicates that in-group biases might be a relevant driver of responsibility 
attribution, although the magnitude of the coefficient is not significantly different from 
zero. 
Model 1.3 shows that Euroscepticism moderates significantly the impact of 
economic conditions upon responsibility attribution: those who do not perceive that 
their countryÕs EU membership is something positive, are more likely to assign 
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responsibility to European institutions (relative to the national government) when they 
have a poor evaluation of economic conditions than the Europhile voters.
19
 
In summary, results in Table 1 provide some evidence of in-group bias in 
responsibility attribution, although the effect only appears to be significant for 
Eurosceptics. Next section provides an analysis on whether the impact of in-group bias 
in responsibility assignments varies across institutional contexts. 
 
(TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
Testing for partisan bias in federal and non-federal states (H1) 
In order to test for the first theoretical expectation, the sample is split in two: federal 
countries (Model 2.1, Table 2) and non-federal countries (Model 2.2, Table 2). 
Replicating previous models for both groups, results show that the interaction between 
partisanship and negative evaluations of the economy have a significant effect in federal 
states but not in non-federal ones. Put it differently, in federal states individuals who 
hold poor economic evaluations of the economy and feel identified with the national 
incumbent party are more likely to ascribe responsibility to the regional or the European 
level of government. This evidence would correspond to a blame-avoiding logic, and 
thus, would confirm our prediction in Hypothesis 1. 
 
(TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
                                                
19
 The interaction coefficient for the regional category shows that Eurosceptics are also less 
likely to assign responsibility to the regional government (relative to the national government) 
when they show poor evaluations of the economy. 
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Figure 1 summarizes the main results of Table 2. It plots the effect of bad 
economic assessments on the probability to attribute responsibilities to the regional 
government for national incumbent partisans and the rest of voters both in federal and 
non-federal countries. On the left-hand side of the figure it can be seen that there are 
almost no differences between partisan voters and the rest in non-federal countries. The 
coefficient, if something, is significant at the 90% level for the voters that are not close 
to the national incumbent, which slightly attribute less responsibility to the regional 
government (and, consequently, more to the national government) when the economy 
goes bad. The real differences between partisans and the rest emerge in federal 
countries, where regional governments are more autonomous and salient, and thus, 
become a credible ÔblameableÕ actor. In this institutional setting, worse economic 
assessments lead to more attribution of responsibility to regional governments by 
partisans of the national incumbent, allowing them to exonerate their preferred party the 
national office for the bad economic results. The effect is quite large as the probability 
to attribute responsibility to the regional government increases in almost 50%. No 
significance, however, is found for the rest of voters. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
To provide a further robustness check of Hypothesis 1 we interact partisanship 
and the federal dummy and split the sample in two, distinguishing between individuals 
that hold negative evaluations of the economy (Model 3.1, Table 3) and individuals who 
do not hold negative economic evaluations (Model 3.2, Table 3)
20
 . In other words, we 
explore whether ÔpessimisticÕ partisans on economic conditions are more likely to 
                                                
20
 We use this strategy instead of a triple interaction for the sake of parsimony. 
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assign responsibility (blame) to the out-groups (regional and European authorities) in 
federal democracies than in non-federal ones.
21
 Results are exhibited in Table 3 and 
corroborate the existence of an attribution pattern that corresponds to a blame-avoidance 
logic: partisans who hold negative evaluations of the economy are more likely to shift 
more responsibility to their less preferred authorities in federal states than in non-federal 
ones. 
Altogether, these results confirm the hypothesis that in-group bias is more likely 
to be activated when the institutional setting open opportunities for blame. National 
incumbent partisans are more likely to attribute responsibility for bad economic 
outcomes to regional governments only if the institutional setting increases the number 
of Ôout-groupsÕ (in this case, regional governments) that can be credibly blamed. 
 
(TABLE 3 HERE) 
 
Finally, a more nuanced account of the effect of partisanship in responsibility 
assignments in federal states is provided. In Table 4, we take into account the possibility 
that the effect or partisanship may vary across regions depending on whether or not 
regional governments are ruled by the same party that rules the national government. 
Partisanship is expected to moderate blame attribution more strongly when national and 
regional governments are ruled by different parties; in these situations, partisans can 
identify the regional government as a clear-cut Ôout-groupÕ to put the blame on. 
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 The wording of the question is ÔWhat do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 
months ago, do you think that the general economic situation in [country]Õ: 1 = a lot better; 2 = 
a little better: 3 = stayed the same; 4 = a little worse; 5 = a lot worse. 
 19 
There is data available on the region of residence of the EES respondents for 
some of the federal and quasi-federal countries in the sample.
22
 Specifically, for Austria 
(2009 and 2014), Germany (2009 and 2014), Spain (2014), Italy (2014) and the two 
devolved regions of the United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales (2009 and 2014). We 
have created a variable named Non-Affiliated, which is coded as 1 when the region is 
ruled by a different party than the one that rules the national government and 0 
otherwise. The basic model of the paper is replicated, now interacting non-affiliated 
regions with partisanship. Results show that blame attribution is more predominant in 
non-affiliated regions. In other words, national incumbent partisans tend to significantly 
assign more responsibility to regional governments when the latter are not ruled by their 
preferred party.  
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
Figure 2 shows this graphically. The observed effects at the national level are 
mostly driven by partisans of the national incumbent in non-affiliated regions. It is in 
these regions where they can safely blame regional governments following their 
national partisan preferences. This is consistent with the blame-attribution mechanism 
activated in multilevel settings that has been both theoretically and empirically 
described above. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
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 The region of residence is not systematically coded for individuals from all countries in all 
waves. 
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Testing for the Eurosceptic bias (H2) 
So far, the idea of how federal institutions open opportunities for partisan voters to 
blame regional governments for bad economic performance has been tested. Next, the 
outward-looking blame attribution of Eurosceptic voters is explored. The argument is 
that in those cases in which European multi-level structures are more established, 
Eurosceptic voters will be more likely to blame Europe for bad economic outcomes.
23
 
To test for H2, we split sample in two groups: the old EU members (all countries that 
joined before 2004) and the new EU members, which consist of all countries that joined 
the EU after the 2004 enlargement or later. The same procedure developed to test H1 is 
replicated here. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Results in Table 5 shows that the general results found in Table 1 are in fact 
driven by the oldest EU member countries. Table 1 showed that Eurosceptic voters 
blame the European level when they perceive that there has been a bad economic 
performance in their country. When the sample is split into old and new EU members, 
this result only holds for the old EU members. In those countries where the European 
level of government is more visible and settled, as the country has been in the EU for 
longer, Eurosceptic voters are more likely to blame this level for bad economic 
outcomes. However, in the new EU countries, where the EU has been present for a 
shorter period of time, anti-EU voters do not strategically allocate responsibility to the 
European level in the presence of bad economic evaluations. 
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 The percentage of Eurosceptics is slightly higher in new EU member countries (46.9) than in 
older ones (42.4). 
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The results of hypothesis 2 are summarized in Figure 3. The figure shows a 
comparison between the effect of bad economic assessments on the probability to 
attribute responsibility to the European level for Eurosceptic and Europhile citizens both 
in the old EU member states and the newest members of the EU (those joining in 2004 
or later). As it can be observed, in those countries where EU authorities have had a role 
for a longer period there are very relevant differences between Eurosceptic and 
Europhile voters. When Eurosceptic voters have worse economic assessments, they 
attribute more responsibility to the European levels (around 10% more likely to do this). 
Conversely, Europhile voters are less likely to attribute responsibility to the European 
level in the presence of worse economic assessments, exonerating it for bad outcomes. 
The differences are significant and show that there is a completely opposed 
understanding and rationalization process. These differences, however, fade away 
among younger EU members. Although the direction of the effects is similar, there are 
no significant differences in the probability of attributing or exonerating responsibility 
to Europe conditional on the European identity. 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
 
As a robustness check, in Table 6 the analysis is replicated, splitting now the 
sample between those that hold negative evaluations of the economy (Model 6.1) and 
individuals who do not hold these economic evaluations (Model 6.2). In each model, we 
analyse whether Eurosceptic voters of old EU countries are more likely to attribute 
blame to the EU than those from new EU countries. The results, again, confirm the 
main findings. This time, however, the interaction between old EU country and 
 22 
Eurosceptic voter is significant in both models. In other words, Eurosceptic voters in 
old EU countries would seem to be always more likely to attribute blame to the 
European level than similar voters in new EU countries. The magnitude of the effect, 
however, is much larger when they hold negative economic evaluations, indicating that 
the Eurosceptic bias is stronger when individual need to make causal attributions of 
blame. 
Summary and concluding remarks 
This paper has explored the impact of individualsÕ party identification and 
Euroscepticism upon responsibility judgements, and tested for variation of this effect 
across different institutional settings. Using a pooled dataset of the European Election 
Survey Voter Study for 2004, 2009 and 2014 in 28 European Union member countries, 
two are the main results of this paper. 
First, results show that partisanship has a stronger moderating role of 
responsibility assignments in federal countries than in non-federal ones. In federal 
states, national incumbent partisans show assignments of responsibility that correspond 
to a blame-avoidance logic, as they tend to assign more responsibility to the regional 
authorities the more pessimistic they are about the economic conditions. 
Second, empirical findings also show that Euroscepticism moderates the effect 
of economic evaluations upon responsibility assignments more prominently in countries 
with old EU membership. Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign 
responsibility following a blame-attribution logic: when they hold negative views about 
the economy they are more likely to assign responsibility to the out-group, namely 
European authorities. This attribution pattern is more prominent in countries with longer 
EU membership. We argue that in those countries European institutions are more visible 
 23 
for citizens and, in consequence, are more likely to become a target for individualsÕ 
strategic responsibility attribution. 
This paper helps to advance the current literature in several ways. First, it 
provides evidence of a Ôselective attributionÕ bias with cross-country data, a 
comparative approach that has been absent in an area of research dominated by case 
studies. Second, it develops and tests some theoretical insights into the role of 
multilevel institutions Ð namely federalism Ð in moderating the impact of cognitive bias 
in responsibility attribution, bridging two strands of the literature that have so far rarely 
spoken to each other (institutional and cognitive bias). Third, the paper hypothesizes 
and tests about the nature of the out-group to become a ÔblameableÕ or ÔcreditableÕ actor 
in responsibility assignments. More specifically, it argues that a specific group (level of 
government) is more likely to become a target for strategic responsibility assignments 
when it holds some degree of power or responsibilities (as in regional governments in 
federal states) or when it is a more visible and established level of government (as in the 
European level for old EU members). 
Finally, the empirical results prompt some questions on the relationship between 
responsibility attribution and accountability. As shown, cognitive biases distort the link 
between outcomes and the responsible level of government. Individuals are not neutral 
when it comes to assigning responsibility for the most important issues in their 
countries: their responsibility judgements are conditioned by their evaluations of 
economic outcomes, their political beliefs and feelings about the EU. In essence, 
individualsÕ cognitive biases in responsibility assignments may contribute to stress the 
ÔviceÕ of multilevel governance for electoral accountability: the distortion of the link 
between outcomes and the responsible level of government that is crucial to hold 
governments to account. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Economic Evaluations and Attribution of Responsibility 
 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. 
Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
       
National Gov. 
Should Deal with 
MIP 
-1.873*** 
(0.131) 
-0.821*** 
(0.0932) 
-1.885*** 
(0.134) 
-0.807*** 
(0.104) 
-1.871*** 
(0.131) 
-0.818*** 
(0.0935) 
Europe Should 
Deal with MIP 
-1.442*** 
(0.113) 
1.091*** 
(0.0797) 
-1.450*** 
(0.118) 
1.075*** 
(0.0865) 
-1.427*** 
(0.112) 
1.106*** 
(0.081) 
Informed -0.00386 -0.0247*** -0.00622 -0.0240*** -0.00898 -0.0278*** 
 (0.0104) (0.00822) (0.0112) (0.00867) (0.00986) (0.00814) 
Medium 
Education 
0.235** 
(0.105) 
-0.0779 
(0.0519) 
0.215** 
(0.0988) 
-0.0879* 
(0.0509) 
0.242** 
(0.104) 
-0.0686 
(0.0506) 
High Education 0.156 -0.268*** 0.127 -0.279*** 0.182 -0.243*** 
 (0.126) (0.0737) (0.119) (0.0752) (0.125) (0.0709) 
Age -0.000690 -0.00327** -0.000374 -0.00295* -0.000609 -0.00315* 
 (0.00131) (0.00162) (0.00137) (0.00165) (0.00132) (0.00164) 
Gender 0.140*** 0.0232 0.150*** 0.0251 0.134*** 0.0187 
 (0.0452) (0.0278) (0.0467) (0.0286) (0.0453) (0.0278) 
2009 wave 0.0394 0.666*** 0.119 0.666*** 0.0506 0.684*** 
 (0.142) (0.101) (0.163) (0.101) (0.142) (0.100) 
2014 wave -0.234 0.125 -0.166 0.117 -0.236 0.121 
 (0.159) (0.110) (0.161) (0.120) (0.157) (0.110) 
Bad Economic 
Evaluations 
-0.0446 
(0.0356) 
-0.0101 
(0.0295) 
-0.0716* 
(0.0374) 
-0.0295 
(0.0320) 
-0.0108 
(0.0403) 
-0.0871** 
(0.0440) 
National 
Incumbent 
Partisan 
  -0.287*** 
(0.0625) 
-0.0389 
(0.0431) 
  
National Inc. 
Partisan*Bad 
Eco. Evaluations 
 
 
 
 
0.102 
(0.108) 
0.0373 
(0.0562) 
 
 
 
 
Eurosceptic     0.207*** 0.0232 
     (0.0600) (0.0579) 
Eurosceptic*Bad 
Eco. Evaluations 
Constant 
 
 
-0.101 
(0.250) 
 
 
-0.669 
(0.188) 
 
 
-0.085 
(0.245) 
 
 
-0.675*** 
(0.196) 
-0.111* 
(0.0657) 
-0.141 
(0.242) 
0.164** 
(0.0759) 
0.669*** 
(0.193) 
Year fixed-
effects 
ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 53,698 53,698 48,295 48,295 53,698 53,698 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Attribution of Responsibility in Federal and Non-Federal Countries.  
Multinomial Logit 
 
 Non-Federal Countries Federal Countries 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European  
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European  
Level 
National Incumbent Partisan -0.266*** -0.039 -0.322*** -0.018 
 (0.067) (0.052) (0.090) (0.081) 
Bad Economic Evaluation -0.089** 
(0.040) 
-0.008 
(0.032) 
0.022 
(0.033) 
-0.093 
(0.092) 
National Incumbent Partisan* 
Bad Economic Evaluation 
-0.004 
(0.108) 
0.021 
(0.061) 
0.519*** 
(0.153) 
0.140 
(0.122) 
Constant -0.108 
(0.240) 
-0.696*** 
(0.220) 
-0.080 
(0.691) 
-0.750* 
(0.421) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 40,762 40,762 7,533 7,533 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3: Attribution of Responsibility by Economic Evaluations. 
Multinomial Logit 
 
 Bad Economic Evaluations Rest of voters 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
National Incumbent Partisan -0.274*** 
(0.080) 
-0.003 
(0.051) 
-0.284*** 
(0.068) 
-0.067 
(0.052) 
Federal Country 0.177 0.133 -0.112 0.182 
 (0.144) (0.121) (0.210) (0.173) 
National Incumbent Partisan 
*Federal Country 
0.493*** 
(0.145) 
0.129 
(0.114) 
-0.0342 
(0.118) 
0.029 
(0.084) 
Constant -0.550*** 
(0.166) 
-0.645*** 
(0.246) 
0.317 
(0.329) 
-0.849*** 
(0.174) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 23,021 23,021 25,274 25,274 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Attribution of Responsibility across Regions in Multilevel Democracies. 
Multinomial Logit 
 
 Model 11 
 Ref. category: 
National Level 
VARIABLES Attrib. Resp. 
Regional Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
National Incumbent Partisan -0.257* 
(0.153) 
-0.136 
(0.097) 
Non-affiliated region -0.078 -0.104 
 (0.192) (0.166) 
National Incumbent 
Partisan*Non-affiliated region 
0.917*** 
(0.248) 
0.251 
(0.285) 
Constant 1.173** 0.350 
 (0.596) (0.385) 
Controls ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ 
Observations 4,140 4,140 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Attribution of Responsibility in Old and New EU members. 
Multinomial Logit 
 
 Pre-2004 EU countries Post-2004 EU countries 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
Eurosceptic 0.259*** 0.0998 0.120* -0.0955 
 (0.0917) (0.0675) (0.0715) (0.0921) 
Bad Economic Evaluation 0.0283 
(0.0520) 
-0.118** 
(0.0553) 
-0.103* 
(0.0530) 
-0.0436 
(0.0719) 
Eurosceptic* -0.168 0.234** -0.0283 0.0863 
Bad Economic Evaluation (0.111) (0.101) (0.0616) (0.106) 
Constant -0.340 
(0.334) 
-0.866*** 
(0.212) 
0.407* 
(0.210) 
-0.500* 
(0.297) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 31,430 31,430 22,268 22,268 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 6: Attribution of Responsibility by Economic Evaluations.  
Multinomial Logit 
 
 Rest of voters Bad Economic Evaluations 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
Eurosceptic 0.112 -0.120 0.0863 -0.0895 
 (0.0733) (0.0851) (0.0547) (0.0664) 
Pre-2004 EU country -0.326** 0.101 -0.120 -0.0910 
 (0.142) (0.127) (0.144) (0.134) 
Eurosceptic* 0.156 0.290*** 0.00819 0.452*** 
Pre-2004 EU country (0.120) (0.104) (0.0896) (0.0941) 
Constant 0.419 
(0.315) 
-0.942*** 
(0.172) 
-0.294 
(0.206) 
-0.609*** 
(0.225) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 25,657 25,657 28,041 28,041 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Effect of Partisanship on Attribution of Responsibility in Federal and 
Non-Federal Countries 
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Figure 2. Effect of Partisanship on Responsibility Attribution by Types of Regions 
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Figure 3. Effect of Euroscepticism on Attribution of Responsibility in Old and New 
EU members 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1: Distribution of the dependent variable by institutional contexts 
 
 
Who deals 
with MIPS 
Total  
2004-2014 
%  
2004-
2014 
% Federal 
2004-2014 
% Non-
federal 
2004-2014 
% Old EU 
members 
2004-2014 
% New EU 
members 
2004-2014 
Regional 9,893 15.72 15.00 15.85 15.84 15.54 
National 37,917 60.24 54.76 61.26 58.91 62.07 
European 15,136 24.04 30.23 22.88 25.24 22.38 
Total 62,946 100 100 100 100 100 
 
  
 39 
Table A2: Attribution of Responsibility in Federal and Non-Federal Countries. 
Multinomial Logit. Only Economic MIPs 
 Non-Federal Countries Federal Countries 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
National Incumbent 
Partisan 
-0.224** 0.0389 -0.181* -0.0833 
 (0.0965) (0.0639) (0.110) (0.140) 
Bad Economic 
Evaluation 
-0.00841 0.0276 0.0906*** -0.0990 
National Incumbent 
Partisan* 
(0.0547) (0.0495) (0.0143) (0.142) 
Bad Economic 
Evaluation 
-0.00414 -0.0467 0.392** 0.212 
 (0.130) (0.0806) (0.180) (0.165) 
Constant -0.205 -0.498 -0.0273 -0.677 
 (0.340) (0.338) (0.654) (0.550) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 23,936 23,936 4,491 4,491 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A3: Attribution of Responsibility by Economic Evaluations. 
Multinomial Logit. Only Economic MIPs 
 Bad Economic Evaluations Rest of voters 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
National Incumbent Partisan -0.246*** 0.0142 -0.226** 0.00616 
 (0.0946) (0.0660) (0.107) (0.0638) 
Federal Country 0.00388 0.186 0.232* 0.145 
 (0.165) (0.151) (0.132) (0.138) 
National Incumbent Partisan 
*Federal Country 
0.0772 -0.108 0.472*** 0.163 
 (0.148) (0.144) (0.180) (0.159) 
Constant 0.177 -0.497 -0.439* -0.564* 
 (0.437) (0.317) (0.254) (0.342) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 12,010 12,010 16,417 16,417 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4: Attribution of Responsibility in old and new European Union members. 
Multinomial Logit. Only Economic MIPs 
 Pre-2004 EU countries Post-2004 EU countries 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European Level 
Eurosceptic 0.0671 0.0570 0.145 -0.0290 
 (0.0901) (0.0694) (0.0990) (0.0881) 
Bad Economic 
Evaluation 
0.00213 -0.121* -0.0549 0.0164 
Eurosceptic * (0.0734) (0.0625) (0.0725) (0.0763) 
Bad Economic 
Evaluation 
0.0360 0.267** -0.0107 -0.00437 
 (0.130) (0.107) (0.0860) (0.0792) 
Constant -0.486 -0.455 0.567* -0.639 
 (0.462) (0.296) (0.324) (0.403) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 17,467 17,467 14,217 14,217 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table A5: Attribution of Responsibility by Economic Evaluations. 
Multinomial Logit. Only Economic MIPs 
 Bad Economic Evaluations Rest of voters 
 Ref. Category: 
National Level 
Ref. Category: 
National Level 
 Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
Regional 
Level 
Attrib. Resp. 
European 
Level 
Eurosceptic 0.133 -0.0564 0.119 -0.120 
 (0.104) (0.0864) (0.0748) (0.0862) 
Pre-2004 EU Member -0.347** 0.154 -0.222 -0.109 
 (0.152) (0.141) (0.162) (0.158) 
Eurosceptic * Pre-2004 EU 
Member 
-0.0473 0.193* -0.0200 0.481*** 
 (0.136) (0.107) (0.136) (0.120) 
Constant 0.472 -0.627** -0.0614 -0.493* 
 (0.450) (0.257) (0.291) (0.284) 
Controls ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Year fixed-effects ݱ ݱ ݱ ݱ 
Observations 13,416 13,416 18,268 18,268 
Standard errors are clustered by country. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
